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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20000556-CA

JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Appellees.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals an order of the district court dismissing
an information charging two alternative counts of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996).

At the inception

of this appeal, the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1996) . Pursuant
to the State's suggestion for certification, however, the court
of appeals certified the case for immediate transfer to this
Court, pursuant to rule 43(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

See addendum A,
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Does the Brickev rule, notwithstanding the court of appeals
interpretation of it in State v. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997
P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), permit refiling
1

in this case, where the record reveals no prosecutorial abuse and
defendants' right to due process is not implicated?
Interpretation of caselaw presents a question of law,
reviewed for correctness.

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357

(Utah 1993); State v. Shioler, 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App.
1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996), governing abuse or
desecration of a dead human body, is appended to this brief at
addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were originally charged, in October of 1996, with
one count of abuse or desecration of a dead human body for
disinterring human bones from an archaeological site near Bluff,
Utah (case #1: 1-2) .l The section under which defendants were
charged read:

1

To provide the Court with all relevant background
information, the records and transcripts relating to the previous
case against each defendant (district court case nos. 9617-22 9
and 9617-230) as well as this case (district court case nos.
9817-63 and 9817-64) have been designated as part of the record
on appeal. For simplification, because the cases against both
defendants arise out of the same facts, because the cases have
been treated as consolidated both by the parties and the
appellate courts, and because the records are largely
duplicative, the State will refer only to the James Redd records,
citing either to Case #1 (case no. 9617-229) or Case #2 (case no.
9817-64). Citations from the transcripts associated with each
case are designated by case number, followed by "Tr." and an
appellate page number. All other record citations are to the red
record volumes.
2

(1) A person is guilty of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully:
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise
interred dead body, without authority of a
court order.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1) (b) (1996) or addendum B.2
Following a preliminary hearing in March of 1997, the
magistrate dismissed the charge, reasoning that ancient human
remains did not constitute a "dead human body" within the meaning
of the statute (Case #1: 109-11).

The State appealed.

Interpreting the statute for the first time, the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal on an alternative ground not
addressed by the magistrate or briefed by either party.

See

State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 232-33 (Utah App. 1998), rev'd by
State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986 or addendum C.

Focusing

on the statute's reference to dead bodies "buried or otherwise
interred," the court of appeals held that, wholly apart from
proof of disinterment, this phrase required proof that the body
had been intentionally deposited "into a place designated for its
repose" as a separate and distinct element of the crime.3 Redd,

2

Defendants were also charged with one count of
trespassing on trust lands, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-30KU (f) (1996) . That charge has been
consolidated into this case by stipulation but has no bearing on
this appeal.
3

In a later order, the court of appeals articulated that
[b]ecause defense counsel conceded at oral argument that the
bone fragments would satisfy the xdead body' requirement of the
u

3

954 P.2d at 234.

The court of appeals concluded that although

the State had adduced evidence that the human remains had been
"disinterred," it had not adduced independent proof that they had
previously been "buried or otherwise interred."

Based on its sua

sponte interpretation and articulation of these statutory
elements, the court of appeals affirmed the magistrate's
dismissal of the charge.4
The State filed a petition for rehearing, focusing on a
single narrow legal issue. Although the resolution of that issue
has no bearing at this juncture, the court of appeals included a
footnote in its order denying the petition, specifically warning
that "[n]o party to this action should construe our opinion or
this order to preclude the State from refiling the charges under
the same or a more appropriate subsection of the statute" (Case
#2: 48 n.2).5

statute we deemed it unnecessary to, and did not, discuss the
meaning of that statutory language" (Case #2: 44-45 n.l).
4

The court of appeals articulated three elements of the
crime: 1) "that the dead body at: issue be shown to have been
placed in a location designated for its repose"; 2) "that a
defendant unearth or uncover a dead body and remove it from the
place of interment"; and 3) "that the defendant acted
intentionally when he or she disinterred the interred dead body."
Redd, 954 P.2d at 234.
5

The court also clarified that its earlier opinion,
"although upholding the trial court's refusal to bind over the
defendants, does not hold that disinterring prehistoric bones in
a proven Anasazi burial site is not a crime under the statute."
Case #2: 44 (emphasis in original).
4

In June of 1998, the State refiled charges against
defendants (Case #2: 1-2). Taking the court of appeals' apparent
guidance, the State charged defendants under the original
statutory subsection as well as an additional subsection that
specifically referred to "a dead body or any part

of

it."

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (a) (emphasis added) . The two charges
tracked the statutory subsections as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully:
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report
the finding of a dead body to a local law
enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body
or any part of it;
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise
interred dead body, without authority of a
court order.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1)(a), (b) (1996) or addendum B.
The next month, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
case (Case #2: 8-9). Citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986), they argued that refiling should not be permitted because
the charges were the same and no new evidence had been
discovered.

Defendants contended that where the State had simply

failed to adduce the evidence necessary to establish probable
cause for a bindover, good cause for refiling had not been
established (Case #2: 10-15; 36-42).

The parties stipulated that

the ruling on this motion would be reserved until after the
preliminary hearing.

Id. at 64.
5

In October of 1998, at a preliminary hearing on the refiled
charges, the State adduced evidence addressing "interment," the
element that the court of appeals had found lacking in the
earlier preliminary hearing.6

The magistrate then bound

defendants over on the original charge of disinterring a buried
or otherwise interred dead body.
704(1)(b).

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-

In so doing, the magistrate stated:

Were this magistrate to rule on the Brickey
issue solely on the basis of the language in
Brickev, he would consider himself compelled
to prohibit further prosecution of
defendants. However, the language of
footnote 2 of the Utah court of appeals [sic]
order on the state's petition for rehearing
strongly suggests the creation of an
additional Brickey exception where the
prosecutor failed to recognize the need for
proof of an element of the offense. This
court takes that language as announcing an
intention to create such an exception under
the "other good cause" prong of Brickey and
accordingly denies defendants' motion to
dismiss.
Case #2: 67.
However, the magistrate did dismiss the new charge of
"remov[ing], conceal [ing] . . . or destroying] a dead body or
any part of it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1)(a).

In so doing,

the magistrate declared:
There is no evidence that [defendants]
destroyed, concealed or removed a body or

6

The parties stipulated that the magistrate could also
consider the evidence adduced at the 1997 preliminary hearing
(Case #2: 64).
6

even a bone. The most that can be said is
that they may have moved as many as seventeen
bones a few feet. This is not removal,
concealment or destruction. Count I is
accordingly dismissed.
Case #2: 72.
In response to the dismissal of the "removal" charge, the
State filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal in the court of appeals.7 The court of appeals granted
the petition and then immediately certified the case to this
Court (Case #2: 87). This Court held that the State had shown
probable cause to believe the bones had been "removed," as that
term is commonly used and that, consequently, defendants should
have been bound over on the section 76-9-704(1) (a) charge.

State

v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, fll, 992 P.2d 986, or addendum D.
Accordingly, this Court reversed and remanded the case back to
district court.

Id. at fl6.

Back in district court on the second information and
appearing before a different judge,8 defendants filed a motion to

7

The sole question of law presented was whether the
magistrate erred in determining that moving human bones from
their place of interment could not, as a matter of law, establish
probable cause to believe the bones had been "remove[d]," as that
term is used in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (a).
8

Judge Lyle Anderson recused himself from the case. In
his capacity as presiding judge of the Seventh Judicial District,
he assigned juvenile court judge Mary Manley to sit by
designation. His order states that "[t]his assignment accords
with the general practice of this district to cross assign
juvenile and district judges to minimize travel and promote
judicial economy." Case #2: 150.
7

dismiss or to quash the bindover based on Brickey (Case #2: 114).
They argued that the evidence of interment presented by the State
at the second preliminary hearing was not new or previously
unavailable and did not provide good cause for refiling.
115-20.

Id. at

In a supplemental memorandum, they argued that an

opinion issued by the court of appeals in February of 2000, State
v. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d
1289 (2000) or addendum E, effectively precluded interpreting
good cause to include an innocent miscalculation of the quantum
of evidence necessary to obtain a bindover (Case #2: 127-29) .
The district court, adopting defendants' reasoning, granted
the motion and dismissed the entire information against
defendants.

The court stated:

Lack of new evidence and innocent
miscalculation as to the evidence required to
obtain a bindover are the two areas that
Brickey and Morgan together set forth as
insufficient grounds to permit a refiling of
charges after dismissal. It is those very
claims that the state sets forth in this
case. While the practical application of
these cases may be unduly restrictive on the
prosecution, in light of Brickey and Morgan,
this court is compelled to grant the
Defendants' Motion.
Id. at 154 or addendum F.

The State now timely appeals from the

district court's order dismissing the case.

8

Id. at 156-57.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS9
On the afternoon of January 6, 1996, Ben Naranjo of the San
Juan County Sheriff's Office was contacted by dispatch and told
that Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, wanted to talk to him "as
soon as possible" (Case #1: Tr. at 69).10

Naranjo immediately

went to Pehrson's home, where Pehrson informed him that he and
his stepson, while hiking, had observed several people digging in
an area known to contain Anasazi ruins (Id. at 70). Erv Guymon,
who was present when Naranjo arrived and who owned property in
the area Pehrson described, told Naranjo that "if it was on his
property, nobody had permission at that time to be on there"

(IdJ .
Naranjo, with Pehrson accompanying him, then drove to the
dig site, located about five miles outside of Bluff, up a dirt
road in South Cottonwood Canyon (Id. at 70, 82).11

As they

9

While the issue before the Court presents a question of
law only, the State articulates the underlying facts as they were
adduced at the two preliminary hearings, as a courtesy to the
Court and to explain the context in which the legal question
arose.
10

For clarity, the hearing transcripts are identified with
"Tr." preceding the appellate record page number. In contrast to
the transcript in Case #1, where each transcript page bears an
appellate page number, the transcript in Case #2 reflects a
single appellate page number on the cover page. Consequently, it
will be designated as "Tr. 164" followed by the internal page
number.
11

According to Naranjo, Cottonwood Canyon was generally
known around Bluff as Guymon's property. The canyon was accessed
by a single, gated road (Case #1: Tr. at 78). Pehrson lived just
9

approached the site, they observed a pickup truck with vanity
license plates reading "ANASAZI."

Three children were standing

near the vehicle (Id. at 71). Naranjo asked the children if
there was any digging going on, and they responded that there
was, but that they were on Erv Guymon's property with his
permission (Id.).
Defendants then came running down from the dig site, which
was located up a little hill, out of sight, and asked Naranjo why
he was there and what he was doing (Id.).

When Naranjo explained .

that someone had observed them digging, defendants asked for
details, claiming that Erv Guymon had given them permission some
three weeks earlier to be on the property (Id. at 72). During
this conversation, Phil Hall, who ran what defendant James Redd
described to Naranjo as "that liberal democratic newspaper down
in Bluff," drove up. Agitated by Hall's presence, defendant said
to Naranjo, "Get him out of here.

I don't want to speak with

him" (Id. at 73). At this juncture, Naranjo decided to "just
back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon and ask him about permission
to be on his property" (Id.).12

Later investigation established

below the gate (Id. at 79) .
12

Despite an earlier statement that no one had permission
to be on his property (Case #1: Tr. at 70), Erv Guymon later told
Naranjo that he remembered giving defendants permission to be on
the land, but not to dig. In any event, Guymon said that he and
James Redd were friends, and that he would take care of the
matter (Id. at 74).
10

that the dig site was on state land (Id. at 97).
An archaeologist from the Bureau of Land Management
described the site and the indications of digging that he
observed three days after the confrontation with defendants. As
to the general site, he explained:
The site itself consisted of a building that
was about 3 0 feet across and sort of a northto-south access with a courtyard in front and
a kiva to the south, and east of that, a
midden area. . . .
(Id. at 100). The archaeologist later explained the meaning and
significance of the term "midden":
A midden, in archaeological terms, is that
part of the site where we find the refuse
from human activity, whatever has been left
over from the daily course of life: broken
pottery, the cleaning out the fire pits, and
all those other things that regenerates [sic]
in your daily living activity. . .
[E]thnographic sources [say] that very often
burials take place in that midden area,
because, first of all, it's easy to dig and
especially with primitive tools . . . areas
that are soft and easy to dig are very often
the places - of repose for - humans. The
second point being that very often deaths, of
course, take place in the winter time when
lots of the available ground is frozen and
even harder to dig, so those soft areas in
the midden are very much utilized as burials.
Case #2: Tr. 164: 9, 10; accord id. at 34. The Director of the
Cultural Preservation Office for the Hopi Tribe, in culturally
linking the burial practices of his own tribe with the Anasazi,
observed that even today some Hopi bury their dead in middens.
Id. at 34. He stated: "When we take a look at past archaeology,
11

we find that the practice that Hopi still hold today was indeed
very common in prehistory times.

We find that the areas most

popular for the burying of deceased a long time ago was in midden
areas."

Id.

Describing the damage to the midden in this case, the
archaeologist testified:
[T]here was a large rectangular hole that had
been -- been dug into that midden, and the
resulting back dirt from that excavation was
piled in the immediate vicinity of the - - o f
the hole.
Case #1: Tr. at 100.

He opined that the digging was very recent,

observing that
on the back dirt piles . . . where the
screens had been laid that were. . . used to
process the dirt[,]. . . [y]ou could still
see the impressions of . . . the screens on
the dirt and . . . because . . . no rain had
taken place, the dirt was very soft . .
.[and] that kind of information would have
blown away very quickly.
Id. at 101.
The archaeologist testified that he found 13-15 bones,
"generally within very close proximity to those areas of. . .
dirt that had been recently screened, as if they had been on
screen there [sic] and sort of tossed out" (Id. at 103).

In

addition, he observed one human bone fragment "still in the wall
of the excavated area" (Case #2:: Tr. 164: 13). The archaeologist
stated, "I felt very strongly that they were human remains" (Case
#1: Tr. at 103).
12

The Hopi witness, describing "the living spiritual
connection" of his people to their ancestors' final resting
place, testified:

"With our clan connection into this particular

region and the beliefs associated with death and dying[,] . . .
the burials that we now encounter are hallowed ground" (Case #2:
Tr. 164: 35) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case focuses on the propriety of the district court's
dismissal of refiled charges against defendants.

In granting

defendants' motion to dismiss or quash the bindover, the district
court relied on this Court's opinion in Brickev and on a recent
court of appeals opinion, Morgan, which interprets Brickey.
Morgan, a split decision now before this Court on certiorari
review, fundamentally alters Brickey by severing the Brickev rule
from its due process roots. When the Brickey rule and its
rationale are properly rejoined, the propriety of refiling in
this case is clear.
Brickev holds that after a magistrate has dismissed a charge
for insufficient evidence, state due process forbids refiling
unless the State can show that new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or some other good cause justifies
refiling.

While the instant case does not involve new or

previously unavailable evidence, it does present "other good
cause" for refiling.

Specifically, where the State innocently

13

miscalculated the amount of evidence necessary for a bindover,
and where a changed circumstance - the articulation of new law by
an appellate court - arose directly from the dismissal, and where
defendants' due process rights are not implicated, neither the
Brickev rule nor the due process rationale underlying it present
a bar to refiling.
Morgan, on which the court of appeals relied in dismissing
the case, is fundamentally flawred because it ignores the due
process underpinning of the Brickev rule.

By casting a net so

wide as to effectively forbid refiling in cases with no due
process implications, Morgan undermines the essential guiding
principle of Brickey and forbids refiling in this case.

It would

thus unnecessarily impair the State's ability and obligation to
pursue a well-founded criminal prosecution without protecting any
legitimate due process interests of defendants.
Fisk represents a better model from which to seek guidance.
There, the court of appeals not only analyzed whether new or
previously unavailable evidence or other good cause justified
refiling, but also engaged in an analysis of whether the refiling
would violate defendant's right to due process.

Finding new

evidence and no due process infringement, the court determined
that Brickey would permit refiling.
follow here.

14

The same result should

ARGUMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE COURT OF
APPEALS' DECISION IN MORGAN,
BRICKEY PERMITS THE STATE TO REFILE
CHARGES WHERE THE RECORD REVEALS NO
PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE AND WHERE
DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS
NOT IMPLICATED
In dismissing the case against defendants, the trial court
relied on this Court's decision in State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 6
(Utah 1986), as interpreted by the court of appeals in State v.
Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 12
(Utah 2000).

See Case #2: 152-54 or addendum F.

The trial

court's ruling concludes:
Lack of new evidence and innocent
miscalculation as to the evidence required to
obtain a bindover are the two areas that
Brickev and Morgan together set forth as
insufficient grounds to permit a refiling of
charges after dismissal. It is those very
claims that the state sets forth in this
case. While the practical application of
these cases may be unduly restrictive on the
prosecution, in light of Brickev and Morgan,
this court is compelled to grant the
Defendants' Motion.
Case #2: 154 or addendum F.

Morgan, a split decision currently

before this Court on certiorari review, fundamentally alters
Brickey by divorcing its limitation on refiling from its
underlying due process rationale.

When the Brickev rule and it

rationale are properly rejoined, the propriety of refiling in
this case becomes apparent.

15

a.

Brickey:

The Governing Law

The law is well settled that a preliminary hearing
magistrate must dismiss an information and discharge a defendant
if the State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to
believe that a defendant has committed the charged crime.
R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3).

Utah

However, "[t]he dismissal and discharge do

not preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense."

Id.

Rule 7, then, by its plain language,

permits refiling as a general proposition.
Nonetheless, the State's ability to refile a dismissed
charge is limited by state constitutional due process
protections.

In Brickey, this Court held that after a magistrate

has dismissed a charge for insufficient evidence, state due
process forbids refiling the same charge unless the State "can
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced, or
that other good cause justifies refiling."
647.

Brickey, 714 P.2d at

Although Brickev did not reach the issue of what might

constitute "other good cause," it noted that other jurisdictions
have found that good cause may exist "when a prosecutor
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to
obtain a bindover."

Id. at 647 n.5 (citing Harper v. District

Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971)).
The policies and protections underlying the Brickev rule
provide guidance in understanding the rule and properly defining

16

its intended ambit.

First, in Brickey, this Court noted that

granting the State unbridled discretion in determining whether to
refile charges raises the intolerable specter of the State
continually harassing a defendant who previously had charges
dismissed for insufficient evidence.
47.

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-

Thus, one important purpose underlying the Brickey rule is

to protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment
arising from repeated filings of groundless claims before
different magistrates in the hope that some magistrate will
eventually bind defendants over for trial.

Id. at 647; accord

State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah App. 1998)(Brickey rule
"ensures that the defendant is not harassed by repeated charges
on tenuous grounds").
A second significant purpose inheres in the Brickey dicta
interpreting "good cause" to include an innocent

miscalculation

of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a
bindover.

Id. at 647 n.5.

This language implies an additional

underlying purpose of preventing the State from intentionally
holding back crucial evidence in order to impair a defendant's
pre-trial discovery rights and ambush him at trial with the
withheld evidence - "sandbagging".
Overreaching by the State, either by prosecutorial
harassment in the form of "forum shopping" or "sandbagging," is
the chief evil to be prevented by the Brickey rule.
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To the

extent that these overzealous practices may infringe on a
defendant's right to due process, Brickev justifiably limits the
State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for
insufficient evidence.

Brickev, however, does not indicate any

intent to forbid refiling generally or to preclude refiling where
a defendant's due process rights are not implicated.

The

lodestar of Brickey, then, is fundamental fairness.
In delineating grounds for refiling that would comport with
due process, Brickev adopts the approach taken by Oklahoma:
[W]hen a charge is refiled, the prosecutor
must, whenever possible, refile the charges
before the same magistrate who does not
consider the matter de novo, but looks at the
facts to determine whether the new evidence
or changed circumstances
are sufficient to
require a re-examination and possible
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing
the charges.
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647 (citing with approval Jones v. State,
481 P.2d 169, 171-72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)(footnote
omitted)(emphasis added)).

A change in circumstances may thus

constitute "other good cause" and provide justification for
refiling charges, if a defendant's due process rights are not
implicated by the changed circumstances.
This case falls squarely within the four corners of the
Brickev rule because it involves both an innocent miscalculation
of the quantum of evidence necessary for a bindover and a changed
circumstance, without ever implicating defendants' right to due
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process.
First, as to the innocent miscalculation, the original
preliminary hearing amply demonstrates the "innocent
miscalculation" not only of the prosecutor, but of defense
counsel and the magistrate as well.

The original preliminary

hearing and the magistrate's ruling arising out of that hearing
focused wholly on whether the "human remains" at issue in this
case came within the ambit of the statutory term Mead human
body."

The State admittedly adduced no evidence of "interment,"

the element later revealed by the court of appeals to be the
source of the miscalculation.

However, where defense counsel did

not file a motion to dismiss for failure to establish probable
cause of "interment" and where the magistrate's ruling was
similarly silent as to that element, strong circumstantial
evidence supports an innocent miscalculation by everyone
courtroom as to the statutory requirements.

in the

That is, the record

itself objectively supports the "good faith ignorance" of all
involved.

Because the relevant statute had never before been

construed by an appellate court, no one at the preliminary
hearing had any idea that "interment" was an element of the crime
wholly separate and apart from "disinterment."
Second, a "changed circumstance" justifying refiling arose
some eleven months after the magistrate originally dismissed the
case.

The "changed circumstance" was the court of appeals'
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opinion in State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1998) or
addendum C, which construed the relevant statute and sua sponte
declared a heretofore unarticulated element of the offense.

The

changed circumstance of new law generated by an appellate court
in direct response to the earlier dismissal of the case created
the need for the evidence that the State had not previously
introduced.
Finally, as to due process, neither of the concerns on which
Brickey justifiably focused are implicated here.
shopping is not at issue.

Plainly, forum-

Both preliminary hearings were held

before the only magistrate in San Juan County.13

Nor is there

any evidence to even remotely suggest that the State purposefully
withheld evidence to harass defendants or to gain some later
advantage at trial. And, practically speaking, because the
magistrate had already found probable cause as to two of the
elements of the crime, the only issue at the second preliminary
hearing was whether the State could establish probable cause as
to the newly-articulated third element of the offense.

Had the

State failed to do so, the magistrate would have been compelled
to dismiss, and the matter would have been definitively
concluded.

Consistent with Brickev, then, permitting refiling in

13

Hon. Lyle Anderson, who served as magistrate for both
preliminary hearings, is also the only district court judge in
the county. While the case is now under the aegis of a different
judge, that action was initiated by Judge Anderson, not by the
State.
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this case would advance the utility of the preliminary hearing as
"a screening device to

x

ferret out . . . groundless and

improvident prosecutions."'

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting

State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)).
The facts of this case plainly do not raise the specter
either of harassment of defendants through forum-shopping or
purposeful obfuscation of evidence through sandbagging, the two
primary abuses against which the Brickey rule protects. Where
these abuses are not present, and where defendants' due process
rights are not implicated, Brickey permits refiling of criminal
charges against defendants.
b,

Morgan:

A Flawed Interpretation of Briclcev

Recently, in State v. Morgan, the court of appeals has set
the Brickey rule adrift from its due process anchor, broadening
its scope without regard for the fundamental constitutional
concern underlying its original formulation.

Morgan casts a net

so broad as to effectively forbid refiling in cases with no due
process implications.

Consequently, Morgan undermines the

essential guiding principle of the Brickey rule.14
In Morgan, defendant faced a felony drug charge of
possession with intent to distribute.

While the State had two

police officers present in court, sworn and ready to testify, it

14

This Court granted certiorari in Morgan. See Morgan, 4
P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). The State is currently preparing the
brief of appellant.
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called only the arresting officer.

Morgan, 2000 UT App 48, f 2 .

The magistrate thereafter determined that the evidence was
insufficient to support an intent to distribute, amended the
charge to simple possession, and bound defendant over on the
reduced charge.

Id. at 13. The State indicated that it had

assumed the arresting officer's testimony would be sufficient and
asked to introduce the testimony of the second officer, who was
still in the courtroom.

The magistrate denied the request

because he believed the entry of the bindover order terminated
his jurisdiction.

Id.

The magistrate then granted the State's

request to dismiss the charges without prejudice.15

Id. at 1[4.

The State refiled charges, a second preliminary hearing was held
before the same magistrate, both witnesses testified, defendant
was bound over, her counsel moved to quash the bindover, and the
court denied the motion.

Id. at f5. A jury found defendant

guilty of the felony drug charge.

Id. at %6.

On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the
testimony of the second officer at the second preliminary hearing
following dismissal for insufficient evidence was not "new or
previously unavailable evidence."

Id. at 1l4. Because the State

had simply miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary for a

15

The court of appeals notes the inconsistency in the
magistrate's conflicting positions that entry of the bindover
terminated his jurisdiction and his later "implicit conclusion"
that he still retained jurisdiction to dismiss the charges. See
Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 at 1(4 n.2.
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bindover, the case squarely questioned whether an innocent
miscalculation would suffice as "good cause" for refiling so that
additional evidence could be presented.16
The court of appeals first properly acknowledged Bridkey's
holding that the discovery of "new or previously unavailable
evidence" or "other good cause" would justify refiling.17
fl5.

Id. at

Morgan then goes on to effectively reject Brickev's

suggestion that an innocent miscalculation of the quantum of
evidence necessary for a bindover may in and of itself suffice as
another subcategory of "good cause" for refiling charges:
Consequently, until and unless our supreme
court directs otherwise, the innocent
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence
required to obtain a bindover is not grounds
for refiling the dismissed charges unless new
or previously unavailable evidence results
from a nondilatory investigation prompted by
realization of the miscalculation.

16

While the facts of Brickev and Morgan are remarkably
analogous and while both appellate courts ultimately refused to
permit refiling, the cases differ in one key respect. The
prosecutor in Brickev candidly admitted he was forum-shopping,
while no such overreaching infected Morgan. Thus, Brickey
implicates due process, while Morgan does not. Compare Brickey,
714 P.2d at 647 with Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, Jl3.
17

Brickev's language makes plain that "good cause"
represents a broad category, with "new or previously unavailable
evidence" as but two examples of subcategories that come within
its ambit. "Other good cause," then, on its face, simply means
additional subcategories, other than "new evidence" or
"previously unavailable evidence," that justify refiling. An
"innocent miscalculation" and "changed circumstances" can be two
such subcategories of "good cause." Cf. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 64648.
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Id. at H 16.

The court of appeals thus departs from Brickey by

nullifying an innocent miscalculation as a subcategory of good
cause.

That is, Morgan imposes a narrow requirement that, in

order to establish an innocent miscalculation, the State must in
every case produce new or previously unavailable evidence that it
could not have reasonably discovered earlier.

Morgan's linkage

of an ''innocent miscalculation" with "new or previously
unavailable evidence" in effect subsumes the former category in
the latter, since the opinion precludes establishing an innocent
miscalculation without a showing of new or previously unavailable
evidence.18
Morgan's modification of the Brickey rule is flawed by its
disregard for the due process concerns at the heart of Brickey.
That is, it would prohibit the State from refiling criminal
charges under circumstances that do not violate - or even
implicate - the due process rights of defendants.

Morgan would

thus unnecessarily impair both the State's ability and obligation
to pursue well-founded criminal prosecutions without protecting
any legitimate due process interests of defendants.
18

At least one other panel of the court of appeals has
explicitly relied upon the "other good cause" prong of Brickey,
finding that charges could be refiled, even though there was no
suggestion in that case that new evidence had been uncovered. See
State v. Rivera, 871 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on
other grounds, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995)(finding that the State
could refile the case if a bindover were reversed for lack of
evidence and quoting Brickey as indicating that an innocent
miscalculation of the evidence required for a bindover
constitutes good cause for refiling).
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This case provides a compelling example.

Here, an

archaeologist testified at the first preliminary hearing.

No one

disputes that this witness possessed the necessary substantive
knowledge to fill the evidentiary gap identified eleven months
later by the court of appeals.

The case, therefore, does not

involve new or previously unavailable evidence.

Rather, it

involves a witness "whose testimony is known at the time and does
not change in any material way after the initial bindover is
dismissed."

Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 Hl5. According to Morgan's

interpretation of Brickey, however, refiling would not be
permitted in this case because the State's innocent
miscalculation of the evidence required for a bindover was not
coupled with the discovery of new or previously unavailable
evidence.

Id. at Kl6.

Under Morgan's restrictive interpretation of Brickey,
defendants are permitted to wield Brickey as a sword simply
because the prosecutor - to say nothing of defendants and the
magistrate - reasonably construed the statute differently than
the court of appeals ultimately did.

If refiling is not

permitted and Morgan's interpretation of Brickey prevails,
defendants will be allowed to escape prosecution on charges for
which the State plainly had sufficient evidence for at least a
bindover.

See State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah

1998)(clarifying that the bindover standard is lower even than
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civil preponderance of evidence standard)(citation omitted).
Ratifying the court of appeals' broad preclusion of refiling
fundamentally undermines the Brickev rule by extending it to
situations that do not implicate a defendant's right to due
process.

Such an interpretation plainly decreases confidence in

the judicial system, in clear contravention of Brickey.

See

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (promotion of confidence in justice
system is by-product of preliminary hearing function of ferretingout groundless claims).
c.

Fisk:

A Better Model

The district court in this case would have been better
served by reference to State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App.
1998), a factually analogous case articulating a more
comprehensive Brickev analysis.19

In Fisk, after a preliminary

hearing, charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence on one
element of the offense.

Fisk, 966 P.2d at 862. Subsequently, a

key witness testified at another proceeding which, in turn, gave
rise to expert testimony addressing the missing element.

Id.

The court permitted refiling in Fisk, reasoning that the
intervening event of the witness testifying at the other
proceeding created "new evidence" and thus constituted good cause

19

While Fisk was actually decided on jurisdictional
grounds, the opinion nonetheless addresses refiling under
Brickey. Fisk, 966 P.2d at 863-64. Although dictum, the
discussion remains instructive as an illustrative factual
example.
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justifying refiling.

Id. at 864. The court also carefully

examined the impact of refiling on defendant's right to due
process.

Reviewing the Brickev rule, the court noted that "no

evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the State refiled the
charges with the intent of harassing defendant" and that the
State made "diligent efforts'' to ensure that the second
preliminary hearing was conducted by the judge who presided over
the first.

Id.

Under such circumstances, Brickey presented no

bar to refiling.
Similarly, here, Brickev presents no bar to refiling.
Rather than the intervention of "new evidence," as in Fisk, this
case presents a "changed circumstance" in the form of newlyarticulated appellate law.
justifying refiling.

Both function as "good cause"

Also, just as in Fisk, the record in this

case is devoid of even a shred of evidence suggesting
prosecutorial abuse or overreaching.

Thus, applying the Brickev

analysis utilized in Fisk, refiling is also permitted in this
case.
Where defendant's due process rights are not implicated, a
change in circumstances - in this case, the articulation of new
law by an appellate court - provides ample support for refiling.
To disallow refiling under the circumstances present here, as the
district court noted in its ruling dismissing the case, is
"unduly restrictive on the prosecution."
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Case #2: 154 or

addendum E.

The injustice in such a result is especially clear

because, where the State has neither engaged in forum-shopping
nor withheld evidence in bad faith, defendants' due process
rights as protected in Brickev have plainly not been violated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the
district court order dismissing all charges against defendants
and remand the case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /SJA^day of October, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
(

:

^

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellant were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to attorneys for appellee, William L. Schultz, P.O. Box
137, Moab, Utah 84532 and Rod W. Snow, Dixon & Snow, 425 South
Cherry St., #1000, Denver, Colorado 80222, this 2-Q day of
October, 2000.

29

ADDENDA

Addendum A

FILED
Utah Court of Appeds

AUG 2 5 2000
OURT OF APPEALS

Paulette Stagq
Cleric of the Court

ooOoo

S t a t e of Utah,
ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20000556-CA
James Redd and Jeanne Redd,
Defendant and Appellee.

This case is before the court on the
certification, submitted pursuant to Rule
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Based upon
of at least four judges of the Utah Court

State's suggestion of
43(b)(1) of the Utah
the affirmative vote
of Appeals,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is certified for
immediate transfer to the Utah Supreme Court for determination.
Utah R. App. P. 43(a).
Dated this

<£*

day of August, 2000.

FOR THE COURT:

5

amela T.. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

\

Addendum B

76-9-704. Abuse or desecration of a dead human body —
Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully:
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to a local
law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it;
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred dead body, without authority of a court order,
(c) dismembers a dead body to any extent, or damages or detaches any
part or portion of a dead body; or
(d) commits, or attempts to commit upon any dead body sexual penetration or intercourse, object rape, sodomy, or object sodomy, as these acts
are described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person.
(2) A person does not commit an offense under this section if when he directs
or carries out procedures regarding a dead human body, he is acting lawfully
under any of the following provisions:
(a) Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Service License Act;
(b) Title 26, Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act;
(c) Title 26, Chapter 4, Utah Medical Examiner Act;
(d) Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Utah Medical Practice Act, which
concerns licensing to practice medicine;
(e) Title 53B, Chapter 17, Part 3, Use of Dead Bodies for Medical
Purposes; or
(f) Title 9, Chapter 8, Part 3, Antiquities.
(3) Abuse or desecration of a dead human body is a third degree felony
except failing to report a finding of a human body is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1968,78-8*704, enacted by L.
1978, eh. 198,1 78-9-704; 1988, eh. 88,1 1;
1991, ch. 341,1 108; 1998,eh.841,1 878.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class B"for'class A" m Subeeetion (3) end

made corrections and changes in the style of the
chapter references in Subsections UXd) and (2).
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13,
1992, substituted the reforenee to Title 9, Chapter 8, Part 3 for a reference to H 63-18-18
through 63-18-31 in Subsection (2Xf).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jon Sd.-22AAa.Jw. 2d Deal Bodies grave-robbing eUtulee, 62 AXJtSd 701.
f 109.
Liabilityfordceccratiea of graves and tombCAS.-28AOJ.&
Deed Bodice | 10.
stones, 77 AXJUth 108.
A
f r ft _ Construction sad application of
Bqr Number*. — Deed Bodies ^ 7.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
James REDD and Jeanne Redd, Defendants and
Appellees.

buried or otherwise interred, that defendant
disinterred body, and that defendant acted
intentionally when he or she disinterred interred dead
body. U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(b).
[4] Statutes <@=* 188
361kl88

No. 970275-CA.
Feb. 20, 1998.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1998.
At preliminary hearing, two separate informations
that alleged defendants abused or desecrated dead
human bodies were dismissed by the Seventh District
Court, Monticello Department, Lyle R. Anderson, J.
State appealed and appeals were consolidated. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that informations
were properly dismissed where no evidence existed to
support conclusion that there was probable cause that
bones or bone fragments removed by defendants were
interred.

When statute fails to define word, interpreting court
relies on dictionary to divine usual meaning.
[5] Dead Bodies <@=*7
116k7
Term "inter" in statute prohibiting intentional and
unlawful disinterring of buried other otherwise
interred dead body, without court order, requires that
dead body at issue be shown to have been placed in
location designated for its repose. U.C.A.1953,
76-9-704(l)(b).
[6] Dead Bodies <&=>7
116k7

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[11 Criminal Law <®=»1139
110kll39
Although lower court may enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law, ultimate decision of whether to
bind defendant over for trial presents question of law
which Court of Appeals reviews de novo without
deference.
(2J Criminal Law <@=»240
110k240

Term "disinter" in statute prohibiting intentional and
unlawful disinterring of buried other otherwise
interred dead body, without court order, requires that
defendant unearth or uncover dead body and remove
it from place of internment.
U.C.A.1953,
76-9-704(l)(b).
[7] Statutes <@=>206
361k206
Any interpretation of statutory language that would
nullify other statutory provisions is improper.
[8] Dead Bodies <&=>7
116k7

Although review of bind over decision is based upon
correctness standard, reviewing court should give
some deference to magistrate's factual findings when
issues of credibility and demeanor of witnesses are
important to finding probable cause.
[31 Dead Bodies <@=»7
116k7
To prove prima facie case for intentionally and
unlawfully disinterring buried or otherwise interred
dead body, without court order, State must prove
three elements: that dead body involved in crime was

In enacting statute prohibiting intentional and
unlawful disinterring of buried or otherwise interred
dead body, without court order, legislature intended
this statute to prohibit disinterment only of dead
bodies shown to have been intentionally deposited in
place of repose. U.C.A.1953, 76-9- 704(l)(b).
[9] Dead Bodies <®^7
116k7
Sole fact that bones unearthed by defendants were
underground, in midden area at an ancient dwelling
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site, when found did not raise reasonable inference
that bones were intentionally deposited in earth for
purpose of placing them in repose so that their
removal would constitute disinterment under statute,
and thus, State failed to establish essential element of
crime of intentionally and unlawfully disinterring
buried or otherwise interred dead body U C A 1953,
76-9-704(1 )(b)
[101 Criminal Law <®=>238(1)
110k238(l)
In making determination as to probable cause,
magistrate should view evidence in light most
favorable to prosecution and resolve all inferences in
favor of prosecution
[11] Criminal Law <@=>238(1)
110k238(l)
Unless evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which
supports prosecution's claim, magistrate should bmd
defendant over for trial.
[12] Criminal Law <®=>304(1)
110k304(l)
Exceptional circumstances did not exist justifying
departure from normal reservation of taking judicial
notice of fact when motion to so is made first time on
appeal, and thus, Court of Appeals refused to take
judicial notice of fact that Anasazi cultures often used
midden areas to bury their dead, in prosecution for
abuse or desecration of dead human bodies, as this
type of fact was not one normally subject to judicial
notice and was not generally known fact nor one
capable of accurate and ready determination.
UCA.1953, 76-9- 704(l)(b); Rules of Evid., Rule
201.
[131 Criminal Law <@=>1134(6)
HOkl 134(6)
Appellate court may affirm lower court's ruling on
any proper grounds, even though lower court relied
on some other ground.
*231 Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake
City, and William L. Benge, Moab, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
William L Schultz, Moab and Rod W Snow,
Denver, CO, for Defendants and Appellees.

Before DAVIS,
JACKSON, JJ

PJ,

and

BILLINGS

and

OPINION
JACKSON, Judge
The State appeals the dismissal at the preliminary
hearing of the counts in two separate informations
alleging that James and Jeanne Redd abused or
desecrated dead human bodies, third degree felonies,
m violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(b)
(1995). The appeals were consolidated. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 6, 1996, a hiker witnessed several people
diggmg in an area of San Juan County known to
contam Anasazi ruins. He contacted the San Juan
County Sheriffs office and told the office that he
wished to speak to Officer Ben Naranjo "as soon as
possible." When Naranjo arrived at the witness's
home, he told Naranjo that he saw people diggmg at
the site on that day and on several previous occasions.
Erv Guymon, who was at the witness's home when
Naranjo arrived and who owned property near the site
described by the witness, told Naranjo "if [the
diggmg] was on his property, nobody had permission
at that tune to be on [it]."
Naranjo, accompanied by the witness, then drove to
the dig site. On then: way, they noticed a truck with
three children standing nearby. Naranjo asked the
children if they knew of any diggmg at the nearby
site. The children answered that there was diggmg,
but that they had permission from Guymon to be on
the property.
At about the same time, defendants, James and
Jeanne Redd (the Redds), ran to Naranjo from the dig
site, which was up a hill away from Naranjo and the
children. The Redds asked Naranjo why he was
there. After *232 Naranjo explamed that a witness
had observed them diggmg, the Redds asserted that
they had Guymon's permission to dig at the site.
During the conversation, a local newspaper editor
arrived. Because of Mr. Redd's agitation over the
editor's presence and the Redds' claim that they had
Guymon's permission to be there, Naranjo decided to
"just back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon." Guymon
later recalled givmg the Redds permission to be on
his property but did not recall givmg them permission
to dig at the site.
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The next day, Naranjo, another county sheriff
deputy, and James Ragsdale, a law enforcement
officer with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
returned to the site to take pictures but did not collect
any other evidence At that time Ragsdale observed
that there had been recent digging at the site
On January 10, 1996, Ragsdale returned to the dig
site with the San Juan County surveyor, a BLM soil
specialist, San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacy, and
Dale Davidson, a BLM archaeologist.
Davidson
descnbed the site as follows
The site itself consisted of a building that was
about 30 feet across and sort of a north-to-south
access with a courtyard in front and a kiva[
[FN1]] to the south, and east of that, a midden
area[ [FN2]] and there was a large rectangular
hole that had been-been dug into that midden,
and resultmg back dirt from that excavation was
piled in the immediate vicinity of the .. hole.
FN1 We understand a kiva to be a circular
ceremonial structure usually located
partially underground
FN2 We understand a midden area to be an
area where refuse or garbage is piled.
Although the State moved that we take
judicial notice that midden areas are known
as Anasazi bunal sites, we decline to do so.
See infra note 7.
The county surveyor determined that, although
incorrectly noted as pnvate land on a BLM map, the
site was on state land.
Davidson believed the
diggmg was very recent and found thirteen to fifteen
bones he "felt very strongly" were human.
The
bones were found "generally within very close
proximity to those areas of ... dirt that had been
recently screened, as if they had been on [the] screen
and... [then] tossed out"
Based on the investigation, the Redds were both
charged with one count of abuse or desecration of a
dead human body, a third degree felony, m violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(b) (1995) [FN3]
and one count of trespassing on trust land, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
53C-2-301(l)(f) (Supp.1997). [FN4]
After a
preliminary hearing on the matter, the lower court
made the following oral findings and conclusions:
FN3 Although the informations charge the
Redds with a violation of section
76-9-704(1) generally, it cites only factual

contentions supporting a charge under
section 76-9-704(1 )(b)
FN4 We cite to the recently amended
statute because, as it relates to this case,
there is no difference between the statute as
amended and the previous codification
From the evidence that's been presented here, I
find that there is probable cause to believe that
the defendantf ]s did trespass on state trust lands,
I also find probable cause to believe that they
did disturb these-or even disinterred these
remains
Whether that constitutes a criminal
offense of desecration of a corpse, or abuse or
desecration of a dead human body is what's
addressed in the defendant's [m]emorandum[,]
and these are remains that presumably are a
thousand years old. I guess there's one school of
thought that it doesn't matter how old the remains
are, they're still human remains, and they need to
be protected from bemg disturbed. Under that
theory, if these had been on Mr. Guymon's
property they would have been~it would not
[have] been ... permissible to disturb them, and
I'm thinking of all the farmers that have run thenplows across lands and ... disturbed human
remains. [However,] these are human remains
that are entitled to respect, these . people
probably have descendants living today who care
that they be treated with respect.
The
[descendants] of these people probably are the
Pueblo Indians, if... any descendants exist.
*233 The other school of thought is, "Hey wait a
minute, you know, there's a rule of reason that has
to apply here, we're talking about disturbing
human remains that have been buried in a place
that's been set aside for the preserving of human
remains, the cemetery[,] and there has to be a
certain point when we can't .. hold people guilty
.. of a Third Degree Felony because they ... don't
avoid all of these human remainsf,] and ... these
remains are scattered all over this part of the
country.
I presume all over the world this
situation exists.
And I don't know-really I don't know the answer
to the question. There's these two philosophies,
both of them entitled to respect. But, I have to
decide as a magistrate, whether I will bmd over
and hold ... the Redd[ ]s for trial on these
charges....
And this is a statute that as you read the statute in
it[ ]s entirety, I think . clearly evidences a
legislative mtent to keep the people from diggmg
around in graveyards. You [must] report the
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body, you can't disinter it or, you can't dismember
it or damage it You can't commit any of these
unspeakable acts on a dead body
And so
I am not gomg to bind over on the
felony charges, I will dismiss those charges and
while indicating as I have my factual findings are
that they did disinter these remains And if that
amounts to this offense, then this case should be
sent back for trial, and I should be reversed and
ordered to bind the defendantf ]s over
The lower court then entered written findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order The findings and
order provided
1 Probable cause is found as to the trespass
count
2 The state presented evidence that defendants,
in the process of searching for arch[a]eological
artifacts, disturbed human bones and bone
fragments
The state has not shown that the
bones were in their original place of repose
before they were disturbed by defendants
3 The legislature has addressed the excavation of
artifacts and human remains m Title 9, Chapters]
8 and 9, Utah Code (1996), and carefully avoided
regulating, without the owner's consent, the
excavation of artifacts and human remains on
private property
4 The section under which defendants are
charged with desecration of a corpse does not
define "bunalf,"] "interment" or "deadbodyf "]
5 Title 9, Chapter 9, Utah Code (1996) refers to
portions of an individual that are found in
archaeological sites as "remains["]
6
Reading Section 76-9-704 and Title 9,
Chapters 8 [and] 9 together, the court concludes
that in the eyes of the legislature, some time after
a person is buried and one thousand years later, a
"dead body" becomes "remains[ "]
7 The statute clearly evidences a legislative
mtent to avoid regulation of private excavation of
archaeological sites on pnvate land unless the
owner has consented to regulation.
8 The interpretation argued by the state in this
case would extend Section 76-9-704 to all pnvate
lands in Utah, contrary to legislative intent, and
make it a felony for pnvate persons to disturb one
thousand year old remains on their own lands
9 With the consent of defendants, the
misdemeanor trespass is held m abeyance for six
months, for a status hearing as to the felony,
which this Court refuses to bmd over for tnal for
the reasons herein stated
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The lower court then ordered that the charge of
abuse or desecration of a dead human body be
dismissed
The State filed this appeal
ISSUE
The sole issue for review is whether the lower court
erred when it dismissed at the preliminary hearing the
charges against the Redds for abuse or desecration of
a dead human body
ANALYSIS
[1][2] Although a lower court "may enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law , *234 the ultimate
decision of whether to bind a defendant over for trial
presents a question of law which we review de novo
without deference " State v Jaeger, 896 P 2d 42, 44
(Utah Ct App 1995) (citations omitted), accord State
v Wodskow, 896 P2d 29, 31 (Utah CtApp 1995)
Although the review of a bind over decision is based
upon a correctness standard, "[the reviewing court]
should give some deference to a magistrate's factual
findings when the issues of credibility and the
demeanor of the witnesses are important to finding
probable cause " Wodskow, 896 P 2d at 32
[3] The State charged the Redds under Utah Code
Ann § 76-9- 704(l)(b) (1995) with "intentionally and
unlawfully
disinterfnng] a buned or otherwise
interred dead body, without authonty of a court
order"
To prove a prima facie case under this
subsection, the State must prove three elements
[4][5] First, the State must show that the dead body
involved in the crime was "buned or otherwise
interred " In interpreting a statute we " 'give the
words their usual and accepted meaning' " Gull
Labs, Inc v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P 2d
1082, 1084 (Utah CtApp 1997) (citation omitted)
When a statute fails to define a word, "we rely on the
dictionary to divine the 'usual meaning' " Id at 1084
(citing Morton Int'l, Inc v Auditing Div of Utah Tax
Comm'n, 814 P2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991))
The
statute involved in this case does not define the word
"inter" Accordmgly, we look to dictionanes for
assistance
Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1176 (1986) defines "inter" to mean "to
deposit (a dead body) in the earth or m a grave or
tomb " Similarly, Amencan Hentage Dictionary 669
(2d ed 1985) defines "inter" as "[t]o place in a grave
or a tomb " A review of these definitions indicates
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that the usual meaning of "inter" connotes the
intentional placement of a dead body into a place
designated for its repose Consequently, when the
statute requires that there be a disinterment of a
"buried or otherwise interred dead body," it requires
that the dead body at issue be shown to have been
placed in a location designated for its repose
Although in some cases it may be difficult to prove
that a dead body was placed with the purpose of
interring it, such as when the bodies or grave sites are
ancient and unmarked, when a body is removed from
a cemetery, clearly marked grave site, or from a
burial mound, there is clear evidence that the body
was placed in the site precisely for the purpose
contemplated by this requirement of the statute
[6] Second, the State must show that the defendant
disinterred the body Again, because the statute fails
to define the term "disinter," we look to the dictionary
definition to find its usual and accepted meaning
"Disinter" has been defined to mean "to take out of
the grave or tomb[,] to dig up[,] EXHUME,"
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 650 (1986), and
as "[t]o exhume, unbury, take out of the grave,"
Black's Law Dictionary 468 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the
usual meaning of disinter connotes some removal of a
body from a place of interment, rest, or repose.
Although the Redds contend that disinterment means
removal from the place of original repose, the usual
meaning of the term clearly does not place such a
restriction on the word. The statute requires only
that a defendant unearth or uncover a dead body and
remove itfromthe place of interment.
Finally, the State must also prove that the defendant
acted intentionally when he or she disinterred the
interred dead body.
[7] The State apparently does not agree that the first
element is independent of the second. It argues that
the lower court properly concluded that probable
cause existed as to all the factual elements under this
subsection when the court simply noted that the bones
and bone fragments had been "disinterred."
However, "[w]e ... assume the Legislature carefully
and advisedly chose the statute's words and phrases."
DeLand v Uintah County, 945 P 2d 172, 174 (Utah
CtApp 1997)
Additionally, we adhere to the
principle that
[a] statute is passed as a whole and not m parts or
sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intent. Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every
other part or section so as to produce a

harmonious whole
Thus, it is not proper to
confine *235 interpretation to the one section to
be construed
[W]hen interpreting a statute all
parts must be construed together without
accordmg undue importance to a single or
isolated portion
2A Norman J Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 46 05, at 103 (5th ed 1992) (footnotes
omitted); see Nixon v Salt Lake City Corp, 898
P2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995) ("[W]e note that an
equally important rule of statutory construction is that
a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of
its provisions construed to be harmonious with each
other and with the overall legislative objective of the
statute."), Gull Labs , 936 P 2d at 1085 (construing
word's dictionary definition "in harmony with the
general theme of the other subsections"), State v
Scieszka, 897 P2d 1224, 1227 (Utah CtApp 1995)
(stating "a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation
requires that a statute Tje looked at in its entirety and
in accordance with the purpose which was sought to
be accomplished* " (citation omitted))
Thus, any
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify
other statutory provisions is improper See Downey
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P 2d 1286,
1288 (Utah 1978) (finding improper interpretation of
statutory language that "would make
phrases
surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v Utah Dep't of
Commerce, 828 P2d 507, 513-14 (Utah
CtApp. 1992) (finding proposed interpretation of
statute improper because it would "impermissibly
render [a statutory] provision a complete nullity")
[8] If we were to interpret section 76-9-704(1 )(b) to
include the removal of any dead body without
reference to whether it was interred, we would clearly
violate these canons of statutory construction. We
presume that when the Legislature chose the terms
"disinter" and "inter" in its prohibitions, it intended to
use both terms as they are normally understood.
Accordingly, we must conclude that the Legislature
intended this subsection to prohibit the disinterment
only of dead bodies shown to have been intentionally
deposited m a place of repose
Further, any
interpretation that would eliminate the interment
requirement would render the language of subsection
76-9-704(1 )(a), which specifically prohibits the
removal or destruction of any dead body, mere
surplusage. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(a)
(1995) (prohibiting "intentionally and unlawfully
remov[ing] . or destroy[ing] a dead body or any part
of it").
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We now turn our attention to the Redds' arguments.
They contend that the lower court made a factual
finding in paragraph two of its written order that the
Redds did not disinter a dead body. Thus, the Redds
argue that we are bound by that finding and cannot
look to the lower court's oral decision to contradict
that finding. We note first that we disagree with the
characterization that paragraph two declares the State
did not prove disinterment. [FN5] We conclude that
the written order is at best ambiguous and that the
lower court's oral statements make clear that the
lower court concluded that probable cause as to the
second element, disinterment, had been met.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, the lower court's
statements reflect a legal conclusion that is not
entitled to deference.
FN5. Although the Redds claim that
paragraph two of the written findings and
order conclusively determined there was no
disinterment because it declared that the
State had not shown that the bones were in
their original place of repose, paragraph two
is ambiguous as it relates to the question of
disinterment. Since disinterment does not
depend upon evidence that a body was in its
original place of repose, and paragraph two
states that the bones were "disturbed," it is
far from clear to us that the lower court
concluded that the bones had not been
disinterred.
[9][10][11][12][13] However, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, [FN6] there was no evidence presented
*236 at the preliminary hearing which would support
the first required element that the bones and bone
fragments involved in this case had been interred.
The evidence and any inferences from the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing show only that
the bones were unearthed from a midden area at an
ancient dwelling site. [FN7] The State called no
witnesses, expert or otherwise, to establish that these
bones were intentionally deposited in the earth in a
place of repose.
Although in other cases an
inference of interment might arise where bones are
found in the ground, such as when bones are found
along with metal hinges similar to those found on
coffins or where the bones are found in a place known
to be used for burial of bodies, the sole fact that
bones are underground when found does not raise a
reasonable inference that the bones were intentionally
deposited in the earth for the purpose of placing them
in repose. The State must show more to raise such
an inference. Thus, m this case, the State failed to
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present a quantum of evidence sufficient to submit the
case to a trier of fact on an essential element of the
crime charged. Accordingly, we affirm the lower
court's dismissal of the informations. [FN8]
FN6 Preliminary hearings are adversarial
proceedings in which the prosecution must
present sufficient evidence to establish that
"the crime charged has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it." "The
prosecution is not required to introduce
enough evidence to establish the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to
warrant submission of the case to the trier of
fact."
In making a determination as to
probable cause, the magistrate should view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and resolve all inferences in
favor of the prosecution
Moreover,
"[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and
incapable of reasonable inference to prove
some
issue
which
supports
the
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate
should bind the defendant over for trial.
State v. Pledger, 896 P 2d 1226, 1229 (Utah
1995) (citations omitted).
FN7. During oral argument, the State urged
us, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, to take judicial notice of the
fact that Anasazi cultures often used midden
areas to bury their dead.
However, the
State never moved for the lower court to
take judicial notice of this fact. In Trimble
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758
P 2d 451 (Utah Ct.App.1988), we held that,
except in exceptional circumstances, we
would normally refuse to take judicial
notice of a fact when such a motion is
made for the first time on appeal. See
id. at 456.
The State presented no
"compelling 'countervailing principle' "
that would overcome our normal
reluctance to take judicial notice in
these
circumstances.
See
id.
(discussing sufficiently
compelling
reasons to justify taking judicial notice
when motion was made for first tune
on appeal).
Because we can see no
exceptional circumstance justifying a
departure from our normal reservation,
and because we otherwise conclude
that this type of fact is not one
normally subject to judicial notice-it
certainly is not a "generally known"
fact nor one "capable of accurate and
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ready determination"-we decline to
take judicial notice as requested by the
State.
FN8 Because we have concluded that the
evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing did not support a bind over on a
charge brought pursuant to section
76-9-704(1 )(b), we need not consider
whether bones and bone fragments
unconnected to and not identifiable as a
dead body can be considered a "dead body"
under the statute
We also need not
consider the related argument that the
statute does not apply to the recovery of
ancient dead bodies, I e, that sufficiently
old bodies are not "dead bodies" but
"remains," the recovery of which are
governed by other statutes, see, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -307 (1996 &
Supp.1997) (Utah Antiquities Act); id.
§§ 9-9-401 to -406 (Native American
Grave Protection and Repatriation
Act). We note that, even though the lower
court relied on its statutory interpretation of

the term "dead body" to dismiss the
information, "[i]t is well settled that an
appellate court may affirm a lower court's
ruling on any proper grounds, even though
the lower court relied on some other
ground." DeBry v Noble, 889 P 2d 428,
444 (Utah 1995)
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the lower court correctly dismissed
the informations. Because no evidence was presented
at the preliminary hearing that the bones or bone
fragments removed from the midden area were
intentionally deposited there to place them in final
repose, no evidence existed that could support a
conclusion that there was probable cause that the
bones were interred. Accordingly, we affirm the
lower court's orders dismissing the charges of abuse
or desecration of a dead human body.
DAVIS, P J., and BILLINGS, J., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
James and Jeanne REDD, Defendants and
Appellees.

The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness, according no
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion.
[3] Dead Bodies <@=>7
116k7

No. 981747.
Dec. 28, 1999.
The Seventh District Court, Monticello Department,
Lyle R. Anderson, J., dismissed informations that
alleged defendants abused or desecrated dead human
bodies by disinterring dead bodies at dig site known
to have Anasazi ruins. The Court of Appeals, 954
P.2d 230, held that informations were properly
dismissed in absence of evidence that bones or bone
fragments removed by defendants had been interred.
Defendants were recharged with original offense and
with removal, concealment, or failure to report
finding of dead body or destruction of dead body.
Following preliminary hearing, the Seventh District
Court, San Juan County, Lyle R. Anderson, J.,
dismissed new charges and issued bindover on
original charges. State took interlocutory appeal. The
Court of Appeals certified case. The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) moving bones to back
dirt pile at site was "removal" within statute, and (2)
statute protected partial remains as well as intact
bodies.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts <®=>487(1)
106k487(l)
In certifying case for immediate transfer to Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals was not permitted to add
issues to certification not present in case before it,
and thus, where only issue appealed by State was
dismissal of new charge of removal, concealment, or
destruction of a dead body or any part of it, issue of
whether refiling of other charges was merited by
evidence and whether refiling violated due process
principles of Brickey was not before Supreme Court.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 43(a);
U.C.A.1953,
76-9-704(l)(a)(1998).
[21 Criminal Law <®=>1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim

Defendants, in digging at site of Anasazi runs,
"removed a dead body," within meaning of criminal
statute, when they took bones out of ground and move
them to back dirt piles. U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(a)
(1998).
[4) Dead Bodies <@=*7
116k7
Statute prohibiting the removal, concealment, failure
to report finding of a dead body to a local law
enforcement agency, or "destruction of a dead body
or any part of it" reaches the removal, concealment,
or failure to report the finding of parts of bodies, such
as heads, torsos, arms, legs, bones, or organs.
U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(a) (1998).
[5) Statutes <®=> 181(2)
361kl81(2)
[51 Statutes <®=»212.7
361k212.7
Where Supreme Court is faced with two alternative
readings of statute, and has reliable sources that
clearly fix the legislative purpose, Court looks to the
consequences of those readings to determine the
meaning to be given the statute, with clear preference
for reading that reflects sound public policy, as Court
presumes that must be what the legislature intended.
[6] Statutes <§=>181(2)
361kl81(2)
Court interprets
consequences.

a

statute

to

avoid

absurd

[71 Dead Bodies <®=»7
116k7
Defendants' alleged conduct of excavating human
bones at Anasazi site and discarding bones in back
dirt piles at site was within statute prohibiting the
removal, concealment, failure to report finding of a
dead body to a local law enforcement agency, or
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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"destruction of a dead body or any part of it," as
statute applied to body parts as well as whole bodies
U C A 1953, 76-9- 704(1 )(a) (1998)
*987 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen, Joanne C Slotmk,
Asst Att'y Gen, Salt Lake City, and William L
Benge, Moab, for plaintiff
Walter F Bugden, Jr, Salt Lake City, William L
Schultz, Moab, and
Rod W Snow, Denver,
Colorado, for defendants
ZIMMERMAN, Justice
K 1 The State of Utah appeals from a magistrate's
dismissal of a charge against James and Jeanne Redd
for violating section 76-9-704(1 )(a) of the Code by
the removal, concealment, or failure to report the
finding of a dead body to a local law enforcement
agency, or destruction of a dead body or any part of
it [FN1] We agree with the State that the magistrate
erred in his interpretation of the statute by concluding
that the facts alleged did not constitute a violation,
and in dismissing the charges
We reverse and
remand for actions consistent with this opinion.
FN I The court of appeals certified this case
to this court pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provides "In any case over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction, the court may certify a case
for immediate transfer to the Supreme
Court for determination"
Utah
RApp P 43(a)
We assume
jurisdiction under section 78-2-2(3)(b)
and(5)oftheUtahCode
*988 H 2 For clarity, we explain the entire history of
this case In January of 1996, Ben Naranjo of the
San Juan County Sheriff s Department was contacted
by Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, Utah. Pehrson
informed Naranjo that he had witnessed several
people digging in an area known to have Anasazi
ruins Naranjo drove close to the dig site where he
saw the Redds They asked Naranjo what he was
doing there
He responded that someone had
observed them digging in the area.
U 3 James Redd ("James") stated that they were on
Erv Guymon's property and that Guymon had given
them permission to be there
Naranjo spoke with
Guymon who said that the Redds did have permission
to be on the property but not to dig Guymon said
that he would handle the problem with the Redds
personally Despite James* claim that he was on

Guymon's property, Naranjo decided to verify
ownership of the dig site A survey was conducted
and it was determined that the site was on state land
The San Juan County Sheriff then called in Dale
Davidson, an archaeologist, to examine the site
% 4 In October of 1996, the Redds were charged with
abuse or desecration of a dead human body, in
violation of 76-9-704(1 )(b) [FN2] A preliminary
hearing was held in March of 1997 Davidson, the
archaeologist, testified that the Redds had dug in an
archaeological site, which included a kiva, a building,
and a midden area. Davidson also testified that the
site had been altered and damaged by recent digging
He stated that he found human bones in the wall of
the excavated area, as well as in a pile of dirt
discarded dunng the excavation
He also testified
that it appeared that the persons digging had
excavated a portion of the human remains and
discarded them after screening the dirt in which they
were buried.
FN2 Section 76-9-704( 1 )(b) reads
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body if the
person intentionally and unlawfully
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred
dead body, without authority of a court
order
Utah Code Ann § 76-9-704(1 )(b) (1995)
In 1999, the legislature amended section
76-9-704 It added a new subsection which
reads 'For purposes of this section, dead
human bod/ includes any part of a human
body in any stage of decomposition
including ancient human remains" Id §
76-9-704(1) (1999) However, we apply
the law as it existed at the time of the crime
charged
Defendants were also charged with
trespassing on trust lands, in violation of
section 53C-2-301(l)(f) of the Code
Defendants were bound over on the
trespassing charge, this charge was
later refiled and no appeal of the
charge has been taken
H 5 The magistrate dismissed the charge of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body He made factual
findings that the Redds did disinter remains
However, he was uncertain about whether disinterring
remains which "presumably are a thousand years old"
"constitutes a criminal offense of desecration of a
corpse, or abuse or desecration of a dead human
body " [FN3] Therefore, he dismissed the charges,
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stating that the appellate court could clarify whether
the law was meant to apply to these facts
FN3 The magistrate said that there are two
schools of thought regarding the appropriate
reach of the statute one adheres to the
position "that it doesn't matter how old the
remains are, they're still human remains,
and they need to be protected from being
disturbed The other school of thought is,
'Hey wait a minute, you know, there's a rule
of reason that has to apply here, [the statute
is] talking about disturbing human remains
that have been buried in a place that's been
set aside for the preserving of human
remains, the cemetery [T]hese [Anasazi]
remains are scattered all over this part of the
country'"
% 6 The State appealed the magistrate's decision to
the Utah Court of Appeals At oral argument before
the court of appeals, the Redds' attorney conceded
that the bones the Redds had removed constitute a
"dead body" as defined by the statute The court of
appeals upheld the magistrate's dismissal on
alternative grounds not addressed by the magistrate or
briefed by the parties. It reasoned that the statute
refers only to dead bodies "buried or otherwise
interred" and that this meant that one element of the
crime was proof that the body had been intentionally
placed "into a place designated for its repose." State
v Redd, 954 P2d 230, 234 (Utah CtAppl998).
The court of appeals *989 held that the State had
failed to prove that element of the charged crime.
The State petitioned for a rehearing, contendmg that
the court should have taken judicial notice of the fact
that midden areas were used as burial grounds by the
Anasazi.
The court of appeals refused to take
judicial notice of this fact. It stated, however, "[n]o
party to this action should construe our opinion or
this order to preclude the State from refiling the
charges under the same or a more appropriate
subsection of the statute."
K 7 The State followed the suggestion of the court of
appeals and refiled the charges against the Redds
under section 76-9-704(1 )(b). Additionally, it charged
the Redds under section 76-9-704(1 )(a). It alleged
that the Redds "did intentionally and unlawfully
remove, conceal, fail to report the finding of a dead
body to a local law enforcement agency, or destroy a
dead body or any part of it," and that they "did
intentionally and unlawfully disinter a buried or
otherwise interred dead body, without authority of a
court order" The State offered new testimony from
Davidson, the archaeologist, regarding burial

practices of the Anasazi to support these refiled
charges
The Redds moved to dismiss the refiled
charges, asserting that their due process rights were
being violated They relied on State v Bnckey, 714
P 2d 644 (Utah 1986), arguing that the "good cause"
showing Bnckey requires as a precondition for the
refiling of dismissed charges exists only when the
State has new or previously-unavailable evidence
They asserted that no such evidence existed
Everything Davidson would say was known and
available to the State when the first charges were
filed. The State responded that it could not have
foreseen the need for Davidson's additional testimony
until the court of appeals, sua sponte, added an
element to the crime The parties stipulated that a
ruling on the Bnckey motion would be reserved until
after the preliminary heanng
f 8 A preliminary heanng was held at which
Davidson explamed that a midden area is "that part of
the site where we find the refuse [sic] from human
activity
[V]ery often bunals take place in that
midden area, because
it's easy to dig and areas
that are soft and easy to dig in are very often placesof repose-for humans... [V]ery often deaths, of
course, take place m the winter time when lots of the
available ground is frozen and even harder to dig, so
those soft areas m the midden are very much utilized
as bunals." The magistrate bound the defendants over
on the refiled onginal charge, under section
76-9-704(1 )(b), of disinterring a buned or otherwise
interred dead body without authonty of a court order
The magistrate specifically found that the State had
shown probable cause to believe that the defendants
disinterred human bones that had once been "buned
or otherwise interred." However, the magistrate
dismissed the second charge, based on section 76-9704(1 )(a) of the Code, of removing, concealmg, or
failing to report the finding of a dead body to local
law enforcement, or destroying a dead body or any
part of it. He stated that: "There is no evidence that
[the defendants] destroyed, concealed or removed a
body or even a bone. The most that can be said is
that they may have moved as many as seventeen
bones a few feet. This is not removal, concealment
or destruction." (Emphasis added)
[1] % 9 The State sought permission to file an
interlocutory appeal on the dismissal of the charge
under section 76-9-704(1 )(a).
The Redds did not
appeal the bmdover on the refiled charge under
section 76-9- 704(1 )(b)
The court of appeals
granted the State's petition and certified the case to
this court. The court of appeals' certification order
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stated that the appeal involved two issues
the
application and interpretation of Bnckey, and the
interpretation and effect of sections 76-9-704(1 )(a)
and (b) of the Code However, as noted above, the
petition for interlocutory appeal did not address either
Bnckey or 76-9-704(1 )(b), rather it raised only the
interpretation of 76-9-704(1 )(a)
Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 43(a) provides that the court of
appeals may "certify a case for immediate transfer to
the Supreme Court."
Utah RApp P. 43(a)
(emphasis added). It does not permit the court of
appeals to add issues to the certification not present in
the "case" before it. Here, the only issue appealed by
the State is the dismissal of the section 76-9-704(1 )(a)
charge. *990 This charge was not dismissed based
on Bnckey, but rather because the magistrate
interpreted the statute as not being violated by the
movement of human bones. Therefore, we conclude
that there is neither a Bnckey question nor a
76-9-704(1 )(b) question before us. The only issue is
the proper interpretation of section 76-9-704(1 )(a) of
the Code.
[2] ^ 10 We begin with the standard of review. The
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law
which we review for correctness, according no
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion. See
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P2d 913, 914-15 (Utah
1998); State v. Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
With this standard in mind, we address section
76-9-704( 1 )(a). It reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a
dead human body if the person intentionally and
unlawfully:
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding
of a dead body to a local law enforcement
agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(a) (1995). [FN4]
FN4 While this section has been amended,
we apply the law as it existed at the time of
the cnme charged.
[3] f 11 We start our analysis with the statute's plain
language.
"The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that statutes are generally to be
construed according to then: plam language.
Unambiguous language m the statute may not be
interpreted to contradict its plam meaning." Zoll &
Branch P.C. v. Asay, 932 P 2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)
(citations omitted); see also Kimball Condo. Owners
Ass'n v County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P 2d 642,
648 (Utah 1997).
In the case of unambiguous
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statutes, this court has a long history of relying on
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning
See, e g , Zoll & Branch, 932 P 2d at 594, Bryant v
Deseret News Publ'g Co, 120 Utah 241, 233 P 2d
355, 356 (1951). At least one part of 76-9- 704(1 )(a)
is unambiguous* one violates the statute if one
"removes a dead body" The magistrate found that
while the Redds moved the bones, they did not
"remove" them. To determine the correctness of this
interpretation, we first resort to the dictionary The
word "remove" is defined variously as "to change or
shift the location, position, station, or residence o f
and "to move by lifting, pushing aside or taking away
or off."
Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1921 (1961). Applying this definition to
the statute, it seems clear that when the Redds took
the bones out of the ground and moved them to the
back dirt piles, they "removed" them within the plain
meamng of the statute.
Therefore, we find the
magistrate's construction of the statute to have been m
error.
[4][5][6] f 12 The next question is whether the bones
that the Redds removed constituted a "dead body."
[FN5] The statute applies to one who "removes,
conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to
a local law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead
body or any part of it."
Utah Code Ann. §
76-9-704(1 )(a) (1995). This clause can be read in
two ways. First, it can be read as prohibiting only (I)
the removal, concealment, or failure to report the
finding of an intact dead body, or (n) the destruction
of an intact dead body or a part of it. Under this
reading, the negative implication is that the statute
permits the removal, concealment, or failure to report
the finding of body parts. Alternatively, the statute
could be read as prohibiting (I) the removal,
concealment, failure to report the finding of, or the
destruction of (u) a dead body or any part of it.
Where we are faced with two alternative readmgs,
and we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the
legislative purpose, we look to the consequences of
those readmgs to determine the meamng to be given
the statute. Our clear preference is the readmg that
reflects sound public policy, as we presume that must
be what the legislature mtended.
See Schurtz v.
BMW of North Amenca, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1113
(Utah 1991). In other words, we interpret a statute to
avoid absurd consequences. See Clover v Snowbird
Ski Resort, *991 808 P2d 1037, 1045 n. 39 (Utah
1991); see also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P 2d
1282, 1292 n. 24 (Utah 1993).
FN5 Although this point was conceded by
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992 P 2d 986
(Cite as: 992 P.2d 986, *991)
the Redds' counsel before the court of
appeals in the first case, we do not assume
that concession is binding for the purposes
of this appeal

Deseret News Archives (recounting finding
remains of American soldiers who died 52
years earlier, were placed in metal boxes,
and returned home)

K 13 We conclude that the results produced by the
first of the two readings proposed, which would
restrict the statute's reach to intact human bodies and
would not reach the removal, concealment, or failure
to report the findmg of parts of bodies, such as heads,
torsos, arms, legs, bones, or organs, is not in accord
with any sound public policy
Therefore, we adopt
the second reading the statute prohibits the removal,
concealment, failure to report the finding of, or the
destruction of a dead body or any part of it

FN8 See Associated Press, Did Deactivated
Part Trigger Crash9, Deseret News, Nov 3,
1999, available in Deseret News Archives
("Authorities have publicly said they have
found only one body and do not expect to
find other bodies intact [from Egypt Air
airplane crash]")

% 14 On the facts of the present case, it may be that
reading this statute as protectmg partial remains of a
thousand-year-old Anasazi will not accord with the
expectations of some persons, as the trial judge noted.
See note 3, supra But a moment's reflection should
demonstrate the soundness of the broader public
policy our interpretation advances. It will protect the
partial remains of many with whom people today can
readily identify, such as pioneers buned long ago in
crude graves, [FN6] or of war dead, [FN7] or of
victims of horrendous accidents, [FN8] or crimes.
[FN9] Certainly, these remains deserve protection,
and we conclude that the legislature intended to grant
it in section 76-9-704(1 )(a).
FN6 See Conrad Walters, 'Modern
Technology1 Saves Day in Salvaging Bones,
Salt Lake Tribune, July 26, 1986, at Bl
(discussing discovery of bones and teeth of
early Mormon pioneer child buned in
Fremont Indian midden); see also Paul
Roily, Pioneers to Get New Graves, Salt
Lake Tribune, August 16, 1986, at Bl ("The
State Parks and Recreation Board has voted
to rebury the remains of 32 early pioneers
and Indians discovered near downtown Salt
Lake City")
FN7 See Associated Press, China Hands
Over Remains of Airmen Killed in WWII,
Deseret News, Jan. 17, 1997, available in

FN9 See State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232,
234 (Utah 1992) (recounting discovery of
murder victim
"Both hands, feet, and
breasts, the head, and the left arm had been
removed
[0]fficers
discovered breast
tissue
The other missing body parts were
never recovered"), see also More Body
Parts Found, Salt Lake Tribune, Nov 15,
1999, at B2 ("After a two-day search,
Duchesne County sheriffs deputies have
found more body parts on the Pmder Ranch
more than a year after the scattered remains
of two bodies were found there
The
victims were shot and their bodies were
blown up in an apparent attempt to destroy
the evidence")
[7] ^| 15 Because the Redds "removed" parts of a
"dead body," and because the statute applies to body
parts as well as whole bodies, we find the magistrate's
interpretation of the statute to be in error. The Redds
should have been bound over for trial under section
76-9-704(l)(a)oftheCode.
f 1 6 Reversed and remanded.
t 17 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
DURHAM, Justice RUSSON, and Judge BENCH
concur in Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
K 18 Having disqualified himself, Justice Stewart
does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge
Russell W Bench sat.
END OF DOCUMENT
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(Cite as: 997 P.2d 910)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Anna Marie MORGAN, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 990377-CA.

[31 Constitutional Law <@=>265
92k265
Due process prohibits a prosecutor from refiling
criminal charges, once dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, unless the prosecutor can show that either:
(1) new or previously unavailable evidence has
surfaced, or (2) that other good cause exists to justify
refiling. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

Feb. 25, 2000.
Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial in the
District Court, Murray Department, Joseph C. Fratto,
Jr., J., of felony possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, and
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance,
marijuana. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that state's apparently
innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence
required to obtain a bindover was not grounds for
refiling the dismissed charges.
Reversed.

[4J Indictment and Information <®=>45
210k45
The innocent miscalculation of the quantum of
evidence required to obtain a bindover is not grounds
for refiling the dismissed charges unless new or
previously unavailable evidence results from a
nondilatory investigation prompted by realization of
the miscalculation.
*910 Kevin J. Kurumada, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Jan Graham and Keith Wilson, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.

Greenwood, P.J., dissented and filed an opinion.
West Headnotes
[11 Criminal Law <§=>1139
110kll39
[1] Criminal Law <®=>1158(1)
HOkl 158(1)

Before Judges GREENWOOD,
WILKINS. [FN1]

ORME,

and

FN1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in
this case and participated in its
resolution prior to his swearing-in as a
member of the Utah Supreme Court.
OPINION

The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion
to dismiss the bindover order is subject to a
bifurcated standard of review: the court's factual
findings are reviewed for clear error, and the legal
standard applied by the trial court is reviewed for
correctness.
[2] Indictment and Information <®=>45
210k45
State's failure to present the testimony of detective at
original preliminary hearing, where detective was
sworn and present but prosecutor apparently believed
that sufficient evidence had been adduced through
testimony of arresting officer, did not provide good
cause for allowing state to refile charges after the
magistrate dismissed the bindover for insufficient
evidence at the original preliminary hearing.
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WILKINS, Judge:
f 1 Defendant Anna Marie Morgan appeals from a
conviction of one count of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(l)(a)(iii) (1998), and one
count of possession of a controlled substance,
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(2)(a)(i) (1998). We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
K 2 The defendant was charged with a single second
degree
felony
count
of
possession
of
methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with intent
to distribute, and a single misdemeanor count of
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

997 P 2d 910
(Cite as: 997 P.2d 910, *910)
possession of a different controlled substance,
marijuana
At the preliminary hearing on these
charges, the state had two witnesses available One
was *911 the arresting officer, Officer Lindquist; the
other was Detective Hansen. Both were sworn as the
hearing began, but only Lindquist was called to testify
by the State Apparently believing that sufficient
evidence had been adduced through the testimony of
the arresting officer, the prosecutor did not call or
examine his other witness.
H 3 The magistrate concluded that insufficient
evidence had been presented to bmd the defendant
over
on
the
charge
of
possession
of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and
instead amended the charge to simple possession, and
bound the defendant over on that charge.
Upon
heanng the magistrate's decision, the prosecutor
indicated that he had assumed the arresting officer's
testimony would be sufficient, and sought to
introduce the additional testimony of Detective
Hansen who was still present in the courtroom and
already sworn. The magistrate denied this request,
apparently on the grounds that having already entered
the bmdover order, he had no further jurisdiction in
the matter, it havmg devolved upon the district court.
U 4 The State sought to reopen the heanng, or in the
alternative to have the magistrate dismiss the charges
so that they could be refiled for purposes of obtaining
a new preliminary hearing. The magistrate denied the
motion to reopen the preliminary heanng, but granted
the motion to dismiss the charges without prejudice to
the State's opportunity to refile. [FN2]
FN2 No explanation is offered for the
inconsistency in the magistrate's initial
belief that he had no further jurisdiction to
reopen the preliminary heanng, and his later
implicit conclusion that he retained enough
authonty to dismiss the charges.
U 5 The prosecutor filed a new information charging
possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distnbute and possession of manjuana, the same
charges as onginally filed against the defendant A
new preliminary heanng was held before the same
magistrate, and both the arresting officer, Lindquist,
and the other witness, Detective Hansen, testified.
No additional witnesses were presented by the State.
Based upon this testimony, the magistrate bound the
defendant over on both charges. Before the distnct
court, defendant moved to quash the bmdover order,
which motion was denied.
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f 6 A jury found defendant guilty
appeals

Defendant

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1 7 On appeal, the defendant raises two issues.
First, defendant claims that the tnal court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss the bmdover order
Second, she claims ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Inasmuch as we reverse on the first issue, we need not
reach the second.
[1] H 8 The tnal court's decision to deny defendant's
motion to dismiss is subject to a bifurcated standard
of review: the court's factual findings are reviewed
for clear error, and the legal standard applied by the
tnal court is reviewed for correctness. "On review,
we give no deference to the tnal court's determination
that defendant's due process nghts were not violated;
however, we presume that the factual findings
underlying that determination are correct." State v.
Pana, 972 P 2d 924, 926-27 (Utah Ct App.1998).
ANALYSIS
[2] K 9 The issue presented by the defendant is
relatively simple: Under circumstances such as those
presented here, is the prosecutor at liberty under Utah
law to refile the charges against the defendant in
order to secure a second preliminary heanng? Our
answer is that the prosecutor is not.
f 10 Our decision turns on our understanding of State
v Bnckey, 714 P 2d 644 (Utah 1986). Bnckey arose
under similar circumstances.
Keith Bnckey was
charged with forcible sexual assault. At the first
preliminary heanng on the charge, the prosecutor
called the victim as a witness and presented her
testimony relating to the charge. At the close of the
evidence, the defense moved to dismiss citmg the
State's failure to introduce any evidence that Bnckey
had acted without the victim's consent, an element
*912 necessary for establishing a prima facie case.
The magistrate agreed and dismissed.
K 11 The prosecutor in Bnckey subsequently refiled
the charge and a second preliminary heanng was
conducted before a different magistrate. The victim
again testified, as did her father, who had been
present dunng the first heanng but was not called to
testify. Bnckey objected to the second preliminary
heanng m part on the ground that the father's
testimony did not constitute "new evidence" since
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what he testified to was known to the prosecutor at
the time of the first hearing, and the father had then
been present in the courtroom.
The magistrate
disagreed, and bound defendant over. The district
court also disagreed, denying Brickey's motion to
quash the bindover.
U 12 The supreme court, however, agreed with
Brickey that "due process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the
prosecutor can show that new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good
cause justifies refiling." Id. at 647. In a footnote, the
supreme court also noted that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, whose analysis it followed, had
held in Harper v. District Ct, 484 P.2d 891
(Okla.Crim.App. 1971), that good cause to continue a
preliminary hearing for further investigation might
exist when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover
and further investigation clearly would not be
dilatory. See Harper, 484 P.2d at 897.
% 13 In this case, the State urges us to adopt a broad
reading of "other good cause" justifying refiling, and
relies upon the claim of innocent miscalculation of
the quantum of evidence required to bind the
defendant over. The State correctly notes that
improper forum shopping has been avoided in this
instance by both preliminary hearings being held
before the same magistrate. As such, it argues, the
only issue is whether or not good cause for refiling
exists here.
f 14 The State makes no claim that the testimony
elicited from Detective Hansen at the second
preliminary hearing differs in any way from what he
would have given if called at the first hearing. The
testimony of Officer Lindquist at the second hearing
contained no suggestion of new or previously
unavailable evidence. The only difference in the
State's case at the two preliminary hearings seems to
be the failure to call the present and sworn detective
at the first, and absence of that failure at the second.
No claim of evidence presented at the second hearing
as having been the result of further investigation has
been made, nor has there been any other suggestion
that the evidence given by Detective Hansen at the
second preliminary hearing was in any way new or
unavailable at the first hearing.
[3] % 15 Our reading of Brickey does not support the
State's argument.
Brickey prohibits a prosecutor
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from refiling criminal charges, once dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, unless the prosecutor can
show that either (1) new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced, or (2) that other good cause
exists to justify refiling. The State does not claim,
nor could it, that new or previously unavailable
evidence surfaced between the first preliminary
hearing and the refiling of the charges against the
defendant. Furthermore, given this first and most
direct requirement, it seems illogical to suggest that
evidence that was both known and available at the
first preliminary hearing could constitute "other good
cause." Other good cause, as described in Brickey,
must at a minimum be something beyond the
introduction of a witness who was present in the
courtroom, sworn, and ready to testify at the first
preliminary hearing, whose testimony is known at the
time and does not change in any material way after
the initial bindover is dismissed.
[4] 1| 16 Brickey has long been regarded as a
meaningful limitation on the refiling of charges. The
circumstances of this case, if treated as "good cause"
for refiling, would simply eviscerate that limitation.
Consequently, until and unless our supreme court
directs otherwise, the innocent miscalculation of the
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover is
not grounds for refiling the dismissed charges unless
new or previously *913 unavailable evidence results
from a nondilatory investigation prompted by
realization of the miscalculation.
CONCLUSION
f 17 Due process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges against a
defendant when the prosecutor has available in court
at the preliminary hearing sufficient evidence to
support the bindover, but fails to present it to the
magistrate.
Once the magistrate dismisses the
bindover for insufficient evidence, the prosecutor
must be able to show that new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good
cause justifies refiling.
Evidence or witnesses
previously known, available and unpresented by the
prosecutor without justification do not constitute
good cause.
U 18 Defendant's conviction is reversed.
H 191 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
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H 20 I respectfully dissent from my colleagues. The
majority opinion accurately sets forth the relevant
facts and applicable law, however, I conclude the
facts of this case demonstrate that the State innocently
miscalculated the quantum of evidence required by
the magistrate for bindover and as such provided
"other good cause" as referred to in State v Bnckey,
714 P 2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986).
K 21 While the facts of this case are similar to those
in Bnckey, they do not present any of the due process
problems identified therein.
In this case,
immediately after the magistrate stated there was
insufficient evidence to bmd defendant over on the
distribution charge, the prosecutor asked to reopen
the preliminary hearing and present Detective
Hansen's testimony When the magistrate denied the
prosecutor's request to reopen the preliminary hearing
and dismissed the charges, the prosecutor promptly
refiled the charges and a new preliminary heanng
occurred before the same magistrate, as required by
Bnckey. See id. Therefore, there is no evidence of
either harassment of defendant or forum shopping by
the prosecutor.
T| 22 The State does not assert that Detective
Hansen's testimony constitutes new or previously
unavailable evidence, arguing instead that this
situation falls under the "other good cause" prong of
the Bnckey test. Neither Bnckey nor later Utah
decisions specifically descnbe what situations
constitute "other good cause" justifying a prosecutor's
decision to refile charges.
However, Bnckey
suggests that "good cause to continue a preliminary
hearing for further investigation might exist when a
prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of
evidence required to obtain a bindover and further
investigation clearly would not be dilatory." See id.
at 647 n. 5 (discussmg holding in Harper v. Distnct
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Ct, 484 P 2d 891 (Okla 1971)), see also Walker v
Schneider, 477 N W 2d 167, 175 (N D 1991)
(explaining good cause may include innocent
miscalculation of amount of evidence by prosecutor)
On this basis, it is likely the magistrate could have
reopened the preliminary heanng and heard
additional evidence
U 23 In my view, the magistrate and subsequently the
tnal court properly determined that, under the facts of
this case, the "other good cause" prong of the Bnckey
test was satisfied, thus allowing refiling charges
Although the basis of Detective Hansen's testimony
was known by the prosecutor and available at the
time of the first preliminary heanng, the evidence was
qualitatively different than the evidence actually
presented at the first preliminary heanng. Detective
Hansen's testimony supplied the magistrate with the
foundation necessary to assess whether the amount of
drugs found in defendant's car met probable cause
requirements for the distnbution charge. The
prosecutor had initially innocently miscalculated the
need for "both officers' testimony, assuming that
Officer Lindquist's testimony would be sufficient.
As noted in Bnckey, double jeopardy provisions did
not preclude refiling charges. See Bnckey, 714 P 2d
at 646.
Only "[considerations of fundamental
fairness" embodied in constitutional protections of
due process bar subsequent indictment. Id. at *914
647. Based on the facts of this case, the magistrate
and tnal court did not err in concluding that "good
cause" justified refiling the charges. Under these
circumstances, I believe that refiling the charges did
not violate defendant's due process nghts and that this
case presents a reasonable and logical application of
Bnckey. Therefore, I would affirm.
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Ocputy

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER
Plaintiff

vs.

JAMES REDD and
JEANNE REDD,
Defendants.

Criminal No. 9817-063
9817-064
Honorable Mary L. Manley

This matter is currently before the District Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or
Quash Bindover.
HISTOfiY
A Preliminary Hearing was held on October 8,1998 on the charges of Abuse or
Desecration of a Dead Human Body, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-9-704(1)
and/or (l)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended and Trespassing on Trust Lands, a
Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Section 53C-2-301(l)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended. The violations were alleged to have occurred on January 6, 1996. A previous
information alleging violations of the desecration statute was dismissed after Preliminary
Hearing held on March 20,1997. Thereafter, an appeal followed. The Magistrate's dismissal
was upheld on appeal, but on the alternate premise that the State had not presented sufficient
evidence of the element of burial. The State filed a Petition for Rehearing which was denied.
However, in its ruling denying the Petition for Rehearing, the Court of Appeals stated in a
footnote that "No party to this action should construe our opinion or this order to preclude the
State from refiling the charges under the same or a more appropriate subsection of the statute."

Thereafter, the pending Information was filed alleging a violation of an additional subsection of
76-9-704 along with the previously alleged violations. The magistrate issued a written bindover
ruling dismissing subsection 76-9-704(1) and binding the defendants over on the remaining
charges. An appeal was taken from the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the
magistrate's dismissal and remanded the case. This motion is in response to the refiling of
charges after the first dismissal.
ISSUE
The issue before the Court is a narrow one: Is there new or previously unavailable
evidence or other good cause that permits the refiling of charges after dismissal at Preliminary
Hearing?
ANALYSIS
In the case of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah
held that for due process considerations, unless there was new or previously unavailable evidence
or other good cause, that charges could not be refiled after a dismissal at preliminary hearing. In
the present case, the magistrate in his Ruling for Bindover made the following finding regarding
new evidence:
"Everything Dale Davidson said on October 8, 1998, could have been said on
March 20,1997. The evidence of Mr. Kuwanwisiwma with respect to the key
issue is substantially the same as that of Mr. Davidson. Thus, the Brickev
exception for new or previously unavailable evidence does not apply here."

The court left open whether or not the "other good cause" prong of Brickev was
applicable. In doing so, the court made the following accurate observation:
"Brickev does suggest that a prosecutor's initial miscalculation of the quantum of
evidence might justify refiling. Here, however, it is not the quantum of evidence
that was miscalculated, but the nature of the evidence. The state did not fail to

present enough evidence on March 20, 1997, to prove a dead body had been
buried; it presented none.M
Thus, the only remaining question is whether or not failure to present sufficient evidence
at the Preliminary Hearing meets the requirements of the "other good cause" prong of Brickey.
Subsequent to the magistrate's ruling, the case of State v Morgan, 2000 UT App 389, was
decided. In Morgan the court commented and held:
"Brickey has long been regarded as a meaningful limitation on the refiling of
charges. The circumstances of this case, if treated as 'good cause1 for refiling,
would simply eviscerate that limitation. Consequently, until and unless our
supreme court directs otherwise, the innocent miscalculation of the quantum of
evidence required to obtain a bindover is not grounds for refiling the dismissed
charges
"
Lack of new evidence and innocent miscalculation as to the evidence required to obtain
a bindover are the two areas that Brickey and Morgan together set forth as insufficient grounds to
permit a refiling of charges after dismissal. It is those very claims that the state sets forth in this
case. While the practical application of these cases may be unduly restrictive on the prosecution,
in light of Brickey and Morgan, this court is compelled to grant the Defendants' Motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charges are dismissed.
DATED this ^ |

day of June, 2000.
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